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The paper examines the reasons that induced Italian Parliament not
to approve an antitrust law at the end of the nineteenth century and in
the ﬁrst half of the twentieth, while in the United States, the ﬁrst national
antitrust provision, the Sherman Act, was adopted in 1890.
Was the American decision to legally enforce competition not optimal?
Or was Italians’ laissez-faire policy on this issue ineﬃcient? Or, still,
were there signiﬁcant enough diﬀerences in the underlying structure of
t h ee c o n o m yb e t w e e nt h et w oS t a t e st oj u s t i f yt w od i ﬀerent, yet both
eﬃcient, paths in the adoption of the law?
The results, albeit controversial, seem to support the last hypothesis.
The thread of the argument is the following: The United States econ-
omy was solid, so competition enhanced social welfare by eliminating the
distorsions generated by positions of market power by ﬁrms.
On the other hand, Italian economy was more diverse. The most devel-
oped industries were smaller and more competitive, in the analyzed time
interval, than their Northern American counterpart. The heavy industry,
which lagged well behind both American and other European competi-
tors, needed instead to operate in a non competitive market to catch up.
Enforcing competition would have been useless for the former group, even
harmful for the latter.
As a consequence, the various lobbies whose special interests have col-
lided with the public interest do not appear to have signiﬁcantly aﬀected
the pattern of adoption of Antitrust.
1 History of modern Antitrust Laws
Antitrust Laws are rules targeting the trusts, in their capacity of institutions
that put in place a system of price ﬁxation and of market sharing that poten-
tially entails distortions on the political, economic and social grounds. Going
beyond the etymological deﬁnition, and setting them in an historical perspec-
tive, Antitrust laws aimed at hampering the circumstances of market power
held by private agents through cartels between ﬁrms or acquisition of a domi-
nant position.
1Many scholars identify in the Sherman Act, promulgated by the American
Congress in 1890, the ﬁrst modern Antitrust norm1; however, seventeen Amer-
ican States, ﬁrst of which was Maryland in 1867, had already adopted by 1890
their own competition legislation; furthermore, before the Sherman Act, there
already existed in the United States some national Antitrust provisions target-
ing speciﬁc sectors. An example of these is the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887, forbidding the practice of pooling2 for the railways companies. In essence,
it is unquestionable that the modern Antitrust Law was born in the United
States in the second half of the nineteenth century.
European countries have not had an eﬀective3 Antitrust Law until after the
second world war. The treaties instituting the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity in 1951 and the one initiating the European Economic Community in
1957 established Antitrust laws in the six original member States, France, West
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. Besides, some of these
States approved their own national organic Antitrust Law, the ﬁrst of which
was West Germany in 1957, followed by France in 1963. Italy adopted its own
only in 1990, after more than thirty years of unsuccessful discussions in the
Parliament4. As a consequence, the competition laws in countries adhering to
the European Common Market are two-tiered, and the criterion for the decision
of the appropriate norm to apply in each instance has to be recovered in the
complicated, and often ambigous, system of legal hyerarchies and priorites en-
forced within the European Community. This generates signiﬁcant diﬀerences
among countries, facetiously summarized in the following aphorism used by a
distinguished English solicitor: ’’In Germany, everything is forbidden which
is not expressly permitted. In England, everything is permitted which is not
expressly forbidden. In France, everything is forbidden, but nearly anything can
be arranged”5.
Historical evidence displays a pattern toward adoption of Antitrust laws,
while no instances of retrieval have ever been registered.
The present work performs a comparative analysis of the eﬃciency of com-
petition law in the United States and in Italy. It analyzes the reasons for the
diﬀerent attitudes of the Italian and of the American law-makers in the time in-
terval 1880-1920 with respect to Antitrust, and then attempts at evaluating the
economic eﬃciency of the two policies within the environment in which each of
them has been carried on. The discussion in the literature over the eﬃciency of
1The Sherman Act is unanimously considered the ﬁrst modern Antitrust law promulgated
at a national level
2Pooling consisted in creating a pool of industries and delegating to a manager the ﬁxing
of the proﬁt margins and the division of the market.
3West Germany adopted an unenforced Antitrust Law in 1924, during the Weimar Repub-
lic.
4Analogously to the American case, the path toward the approval of national competition-
enhancing laws started with regulations concerning speciﬁc industrial sectors or speciﬁcg e o -
graphical areas. For example, Italian Parliament passed a law devolving to the Bank of Italy
an antitrust power for the banking and credit sectors.
5See Kinter-Joelson (1974), p. 192
2Antitrust provisions in the American experience is extensive6, while analogous
works for Europe are very rare. Furthermore, there has not been any attempts
at comprehending the lag of the various European countries in the emergence
of competition law in the light of the economic theory of rationality.
2 Theoretical arguments in favor of Antitrust
Before getting into the core of the paper, which adopts a positive standpoint
to analyze the emergence of antitrust laws, it is useful to introduce a brief
review of the vast body of literature, investing the ﬁelds of law, economics,
politics, philosophy and sociology, dealing with this issue in a purely normative
perspective.
A variety of scholars have studied the theoretical reasons for the necessity
of the competition laws, reaching many conclusions; however, I feel the possible
explanations may be roughly categorized into three groups.
Historically, the ﬁrst argument emerging in the theoretical debate was the
defense of the individual liberty vis à vis the emergence of market power, con-
sidered illegitimate, by the private sector. This idea of a deprivation of freedom
that ultimately threatens the foundations of the democratic structure of the
nations, by concentrating in groups of private citizens an overwhelming power,
has been formally theorized by the Ordoliberal School of Freiburg, active in the
half of the twentieth century. The school highlighted the importance of guaran-
teeing to small business the right of existing per se, regardless of their economic
eﬃciency. Translated into a legal framework, this theory privileges the con-
tractual freedom over eﬃciency arguments7. Flavors of it, of course in an ante
litteram version, can be found already both in the antitrust instances decided
by American Courts before the ﬁrst explicit Antitrust laws - the Sherman Act
and the State laws -, and in the preparatory works for the Sherman Act itself.
Senator John Sherman indeed declared:
“The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order,
and among them all none is more threatening than the inequality of condition,
of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade
and to break down competition. These combinations already defy or control
powerful transportation corporations and reach state authorities. They reach
out their Briarean arms to every part of our country. They are imported from
abroad. Congress alone can deal with them, and if we are unwilling or unable
there will soon be a trust for every production and a master to ﬁx the price for
every necessity of life.”8
The German Law of 1957 was written by Franz Bohm, a member of the
Freiburg school elected in the Bundestag, and was inspired by the Ordoliberal
6An overview of it will be provided in the 4.
7T h ea r g u m e n ti sa nh e r i t a g ef r o mL o c k e . F o rad e t a i l e da n a l y s i s ,s e eL o c k e( e d i t e db y
Lasslett, 1967), II, par. 4
8See Kinter-Joelson (1974), p. 4.
3principles.
The traditional economic argument appeared on the scene in a second stage,
and spread at ﬁrst under the inﬂuence of Marshall’s work, at the turn of the
century, and subsequently, after the second world war, through the teachings of
the Chicago School. Economic theory highlighted the role of competition as the
essential mechanism leading to economic eﬃciency, through the maximization of
social welfare; however, Chicago School theorists, among which George Stigler,
were more careful in pointing out the gains in terms of eﬃciency by concentra-
tion9, thus assessing the existence of the trade-oﬀ between fully eﬃcient and
fully competitive markets nowadays unanimously recognized by the specialists.
Finally, a number of jurists 10 regards prohibition of anticompetitive prac-
tices as merely instrumental to other economic processes. The European ju-
ridical literature extensively documents this instrumentality in relation to the
process of European market integration and of competition between the diﬀer-
ent States. The thread of the argument is the following. As the State have lost
the power of adopting traditional measures of sustain of the national economy,
the permanence of dominant positions might generate negative externalities on
a subset of States. For instance, the States involved in the Common Market
have no policy defense against the low prices charged by ﬁrms located in other
countries operating in condition of eﬃcient natural monopoly11; this could col-
lide with national interests, and therefore potentially hinders the process of
European uniﬁcation. The theory of instrumentality applied to the process of
European integration identiﬁes the roots of the European competition law in
considerations inspired to realpolitik rahter than to economic eﬃciency. Indeed,
a consequence of the theory is that dominant positions would be particularly
harmful if eﬃcient12.
3 Legal analysis
A succint history of the modern competition law is now traced, in order to set
the sage for the subsequent economic analysis. After thir approval, the Antitrust
Laws have not had the same impact on the legislative structure of Italy and of the
United States. In the Civil law systems, prevalent in Europe, with the signiﬁcant
exception of the United Kingdom, they represented a watershed, as prior to
them the courts had no means to prosecute anticompetitive behaviors. On the
contrary, in the Common Law system in place in the Anglo-Saxon countries,
9They recommended a case-by-case examination of the situations of concentration to de-
termine whether the losses from being further from the competition actually outweighed the
gains from increased eﬃciency. Their impact on the American courts has been very signiﬁ-
cant, and has entailed a greater ﬂexibility in the court decisions, emanated after a thorough
analysis of the matter.
10See Amato (1998).
11This aspect is getting increasingly more important, as the national States have lost au-
thority over the monetary policy, an instrument that in the past has been used to adjust the
degree of competitiveness of national industries versus the foreign ones.
12See Jarman-Williams (2001), p. 6.
4in which judges are given a creative power in the absence of a speciﬁcl a w
or of previous sentences regarding analogous instances, the limitations of anti-
competitive behaviors were prosecuted even before ad hoc provisions declared
them illegal; therefore, in the United States the modiﬁc a t i o n sa r i s e ni nt h e
aftermath of the Antitrust Law have not been dramatic.
The present section will examine the evolution, the structure and the provi-
sions of the Antitrust Laws in in Italy and in the United States. The enforcement
and sanctioning systems will be omitted, as a deep analysis of their signiﬁcance
cannot avoid to set them in the overall legal structure of the countries, a task
that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
The formulation of both American and European major Antitrust laws is
extremely straightforward; this phenomenon is particularly striking for the Eu-
ropean countries, characterized by a tradition of enigmatic norms13.
The history of North American Antitrust is very complex and articulated;
here, only the three most relevant and innovative pieces of national legislation
are now brieﬂy outlined, followed by a short summary of the state law adopted
prior to the Sherman Act, and by an overview of the evolution of the American
jurisprudence on the subject. The United States as a nation had their own
national antitrust provision since 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed. It
declared, with an extremely direct formulation, any “combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations” illegal. Furthermore, it prohibited
attempts of monopolization of the market. The Clayton Act, emanated in 1914,
prohibited price discrimination, exclusive contracts and tie-ins14. In 1936, the
Robinson-Patman Act adapted the discipline of the discriminatory prices in the
light of the new market conditions in which distributors with an high contrac-
tual power could obtain lower prices, thus achieving competitive advantages,
sometimes not justiﬁed, damaging the small business15.
Seventeen States emanated their own Antitrust law prior to the Sherman
Act. A wage of adoption was observed in 1889, but ﬁve states had previously
enforced competition, Maryland in 1867, Tennessee in 1870, Arkansas in 1874,
Texas in 1876 and Georgia in 187716.
Even before the explicit norms, the Common Law system punished practices
restraining competition, heading against the pooling and the trusts, promoted
as a way of monopolizing markets17. The judges claimed they were protecting
the freedom of contracting, in the case of “contracts in restraint of commerce”,
and the freedom of third parties, guaranteed against exclusion practices, in the
instance of “conspiracy in restraint of commerce”. Under such circumstances,
agreements displayed restrictiveness as long as they limited the freedom of con-
13Most scholars attribute the cause of this phenomenon to the American inﬂuence.
14The tie in consists in making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other
parties of supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of such con-
tracts.
15See Sherman Act, sections 1 and 2, Clayton Act, section 2, Robinson-Patman Act, section
1.
16See Stigler (1985), p. 6.
17The literature often refers to John Rockefeller as the ﬁrst promoter of trusts.
5tracting of one of the parties, regardless of the eﬀects on competition, or as
long it deprived third parties from the freedom of staying on the market, or
of buying goods or services at the best available prices. As a consequence of
this framework, an agreement violates the contractual freedom, and therefore
is considered illegal, if it imposes to the contractors constraints on their future
contractual freedom. In the absence of such eﬀects, the agreement cannot be
deemed illegal, since it constitutes an expression itself of the contractual freedom
that the system guarantees. According to the competition jurisprudence, the
judicial criterion to identify agreements that actually violate competition laws
is the so-called rule of reason, in which the degree of coercion of an agreement
constitutes the parameter to be evaluated .
After the introduction of a formal law, the American jurisprudence has been
oscillating among three alternative interpretations: the invalidity per se of any
agreement or concentration in restraint of trade, much in the spirit of the texts
of the Sherman and of the Clayton Act; the conﬁguration of a violation only
in the cases in which contractual freedom is excessively limited, in the spirit of
the rule of reasons traditionally applied in the Common Law systems; ﬁnally,
the illegality of agreements that determined disadvantages for the consumers,
under the inﬂuence of the economic eﬃciency arguments18.
E u r o p e a nc o m p e t i t i o nr e g u l a t i o ni ss h a p e db o t hb yt h eE u r o p e a nC o m m u -
nity provisions, and by the national laws. The treaties instituting the European
Community of Steal and Carbon, dating back to 1951, prohibits “all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices tending directly or indirectly to prevent, restrict or distort normal
competition”19. In particular, cartels aimed at ﬁxing or determining prices, at
restricting or controlling production, technical development or investments and
at sharing markets, products or sources of supply are declared illegal. Excep-
tions are allowed if the conditions relative to a substantial improvement in the
production or distribution of the product and to the essentiality of the agreement
for that purpose are satisﬁed. Furthermore, the treaty forbids all concentration
that tend “to determine prices, to control or restrict production or distribution
or to hinder eﬀective competition” and “to evade the rules of competition insti-
tuted under this Treaty, in particular by establishing an artiﬁcially privileged
position involving a substantial advantage in access to supplies or markets”20.
The ECSC norms can be interpreted in the light of the Marshallian theory, as
it prevents the emergence of departures from the rules of competition, which
assure the correct functioning of the economic mechanisms.
The treaty instituting the EC of 1957 presents strong similarities with the
ECSC treaty; however, there are some interesting novelties worthwhile pointing
out. The restriction of validity to “practices that may aﬀect trade between
Member States”21 enhances the argument of the instrumentality of the law with
respect to the market integration. The prohibition of price discrimination and
18See Amato (1998), p. 13-15.
19Art. 65 of the ECSC treaty.
20Art. 66 of the ECSC treaty.
21Art. 81 of the EC treaty.
6of tie ins is introduced. The conditions for the exceptions, mainly the allowance
to the consumers of “a fair share of the resulting beneﬁt” from the increased
eﬃciency, reveal the doubtless inﬂuence of the Chicago School. The prosecution
of the dominant position is assessed.
In Italy, the Parliament has emanated an Antitrust law in 199022,e v e n
though many proposals have unsuccessfully been discussed in the Parliament
since the 1950. It follows very closely the lines of the European norm, with
the obvious diﬀerence that it refers to the national market, lacking the instru-
mentality feature that characterize its counterpart. The explicit recall, at the
ﬁrst article, of the guarantee of the right of business initiative, with the citation
of the article 41 of the Italian Constitution stating the principle of freedom of
economic initiative, suggests a reference to the Ordoliberal theory and seems
to indicate, contrary to the Communitarian legislation, the prevalence of the
philosophical rationale over the economic one.
4 Arguments against eﬃciency
Ap r e c i s ed e ﬁnition of the concept of a socially eﬃcient policy in the present
context, albeit necessarily ambigous, is an essential requirement for the identiﬁ-
cation of the possible roots of ineﬃciency and, ultimately, for the evaluation of
the optimality of the choices eﬀectuated by the decision maker. In the present
framework, a socially eﬃcient policy is one that maximizes the average welfare
of the citizens of a nations within the spell for which that policy will be ef-
fective. It is useful to distinguish between the notions of ex ante and ex post
social eﬃciency. The former considers only the information set available to the
decision maker, in this case the legislative body, at time of the decision, while
the latter incorporates factors that could not be reasonably forecast at the time
of the decision, but have indeed aﬀected the outcome of the policy. Even though
empirically it is not easy to operate a clear distinction between the two notions,
I will try to stick to the concept of ex ante eﬃciency for the rest of the paper,
and show that, however, it is often the case, in the present analysis, that the
two end up being equivalent.
The sources of ex ante ineﬃcient economic policies can be roughly classiﬁed
into three diﬀerent cathegories, those that are determined by mistakes of the
politicians, those that are aﬀected by the pressure of vested interests, and those
that are inﬂuenced by the prevalence of non-economic reasons. It is evident that
not all the policies dictated by one of the three above mentioned reasons are
economically ineﬃcient, whereas I am claiming that all ineﬃcient policies result
from one of these causes.
The present paragraph delves into the extent of the two potential roots of
ineﬃciency with reference to the historical experience of the United States and
of Italy in the Antitrust sector between 1890 and 1945.
A huge debate over the economic eﬃciency of the American Antitrust Law
has recently involved many law and economics scholars. George Stigler, pioneer
22Law 287/90.
7of the positive theory of the antitrust law, assessed that competition law has
been driven by special interests and by constituencies that saw in it an opportu-
nity of welfare-enhancement for their group23. The lobby theory does not clash
per se against the eﬃciency argument, as the two aspects can coexist. However,
on the empirical grounds, the absence of an evidence of groups pressure orients
to an eﬃciency-based explanation, while the reverse is not necessarily true.
George Stigler24 tests the relevance of the actions of costitutiencies opposing
the Sherman Act. The starting point of his analysis is that ”the obvious losers
from an Antitrust policy would be the present (1890), and prospective possessors
of monopoly power”. Using a concentration index of American industry25,h e
estimates the correlation between the extent of potential monopolist and the
adoption of a State antitrust level. The negative correaltion which the special
interest model would predict is actually observed, but it is scarcely signiﬁcant.
According to the author, it is due to the already mentioned minor impact of an
Antitrust Law in a Common Law setting.
Boudreaux, Di Lorenzo and Parker26 test the correlation between the emer-
gence of State competition laws and the signiﬁcance of the agrarian interests,
ﬁnding the expected positive correlation. According to the authors, farmers were
eager for statutes that thwarted the newly centralized food processing facilites,
which represented their natural demanders. Stigler’s work, while conﬁrming the
positive correlation between agrarian force and competitive laws, attributes it
to agrarian opposition against railroad cartels, raising transportation costs. In
this case, the alleged market imperfection concerned the input side of the special
interest promoting action towards antitrust.
Sjostrom27 claims that consumers are the only group that appears to beneﬁt
from banning collusion. However, their high organizational costs, according to
him, prevented them from constituting an inﬂuencial lobby, thus limiting their
eﬀects on the political decision making process.
I will examine the inﬂuence of the consumers group evaluating their impact
as electors, within a simple political economy framework that, albeit not clas-
siﬁable as a special interest model strictu sensu, might shed some light on the
issue.
Before illustrating the model and discussing its explanatory power, a brief
overview of the evolution of the United States election system is now presented.
The United States legislative power is exerted by the House of Representatives
and by the Senate. As the Constitution assigns to each State the faculty to
decide the set of electors, a uniform regulation across the country has not been
observed until very recent times; previously, various kinds of discrimination
arose in the diﬀerent areas, involving race, wealth, education or gender. The
universal enfranchisement for women was adopted only in 1920; furthermore, no
23For a survey of the interest group theory of Antitrust, see McChesney-Shughart (1995).
24See Sylla-Toniolo (1991).
25See (?).
26See D. Boudreaux, T. Di Lorenzo, S. Parker, ”Antitrust before the Sherman Act”, in
McChesney-Shughart, p. 255.
27See Sjostrom (1998), p. 3.
8single State had allowed the voting right to women by 1890 28, which will justify
in the analysis that follows the restrictions to male in the consideration of the
potential electoral base in the Sherman Act time. In 1870, the 15th Amendment
was added to the Constitution, establishing that “the right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”.
Some States, however, responded to the law by introducing measures that de
facto nulliﬁed it, such as ”Poll Taxes”29, literacy tests, or even family clauses
that limited the right to vote to descendants of people who already had it30.
The simple political economy model I am constructing is based on the as-
sumption, shared by all the economists, of the consumer welfare enhancement
by competition laws, at least in the short run31. It does not imply the overall
eﬁciency of antitrust, which, on the contrary, is disputed by many economists,
led by Schumpeter. Each agents value function v(w,p) depends on prices and
wealth. For all agents, ∂v
∂p < 0 and ∂v
∂w > 0.A s a n e ﬀect of Antitrust law,
prices increase. Deﬁning a variable A identifying the level of enforcement of
competition, the relation
∂p
∂A < 0 follows by the consumer welfare maximization
realized by Antitrust, and applies to all the agents. It is more complex to assess
the eﬀect of antitrust on wealth: A subset of agents, called α, participating in
the proﬁts of the ﬁrm in the unregulated environment, is forgoing them with
competition enforcement, thus is harmed by it; a subset β on the contrary was
not beneﬁting in the status quo of any gain, thus their wealth is not aﬀected by
t h er e g i m em o d i ﬁcation. Therefore,
∂w(α)
∂A < 0,a n d
∂w(β)
∂A =0 . In conclusion,
∂v(β)
∂A > 0, while
∂v(α)
∂A R 0, depending on which of the eﬀe c t sp r e v a i l s . A sa n
implication, all the electors in the set α support competition laws, while group
β is split.
Historically, electors have not been selected randomly insofar as restrictions
were put in place. In the United States, the wealthiest citizens have always had
the right to vote. Prior to the introduction of the universal suﬀrage, discrimina-
t i o n ,a sm e n t i o n e d ,w a sb a s e de i t h e ro nw e a l t ho ro ni n d i v i d u a lc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
that were correlated with it, such as literacy, education or race. Furthermore,
empirical evidence shows that wealthiest people have a higher probability of
b e l o n g i n gt ot h es u b s e tβ deﬁned in the model than poorer, given the intu-
itively clear correlation between participation in the proﬁt of dominant ﬁrms
and wealth. As a rough, yet useful, simplifying approximation, it can be claimed
that individuals β have always had the right to vote in the United States, while
the proportion of α voters has varied according to the restricitions. As a conse-
quence, the widest is the set of voters with respect to the total population, the
highest is the relative weight of group α electors, and the highest is the likelihood
28The pioneering State has been Colorado (1893).
29This measure, introduced in California, required citizens to pay a tax to obtain the right
to vote.
30The overview is based for the most part on the following: United States Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Census, “Historical statistics of the United States”, Kansas Interna-
tional Publications, 1989, chapter Y.
31See Tirole (1998).
9of successful pressure boosting antitrust in the decision-making process.
Translated in historical terms, this median elector model predicts that, ce-
teris paribus, the smallest the electoral base is with respect to the total popula-
tion, the highest is the political power of those who beneﬁt of rents in the regime
of legal trusts, the least likely is that the reform passes. From the researcher’s
viewpoint, the United States present the advantage that national legislation is
complemented by State legislation. Therefore, the test for the validity of the
model consists in verifying whether there exists a positive relation between the
passage of the law and the percentage of citizens with the right to vote. To
estimate the evolution of the extension of the right to vote in the time, I have
employed the data on the absolute number of voters, and on the aﬄuence to
the elections to the Presidential elections aggregated by State, to capture the
amount of potential electors in each State at the diﬀerent elections. Then, the
ratio between the potential electors and the male population above the age of
21 has been computed to evaluate the percentage of citizens with the right to
vote. The evidence is that the voting rules enforced for the Presidential elec-
tions reﬂected quite precisely, except for slight variations, those used for both
the elections for the National Congress and the State Parliaments. As a conse-
quence, data on the electoral body for Presidential elections constitute a good
proxy for all other kinds of elections.
The econometric model is the following:
Ri = β0i + β1iδ + εi (1)
where Ri indicates the percentage of people with the right to vote in the
years 1880 and 1888 in each State, indexed by i,a n dδ is a dummy taking the
value 1 if the State has passed an antitrust law by the time considered, and 0
otherwise. The results show that the eﬀect is indeed perceptible with β1 taking
the value of 5.2852% for 1880 and of 6.890684 % (variance of 0.005232) for 1888.
A political economy reason might therefore contribute to the explanation of the
phenomenon. One question that remains to be answered is whether or not there
was actually more need in those states of an antitrust legislation than in the
other states, or, in econometric terms, if the percentage of citizens with the right
to vote is actually negatively correlated with state competitiveness.
In contrast with the American abundance of positive analysis of the evo-
lutionary pattern of the competition law, the European literature on the issue
exhibits a surprising deﬁcit32. In particular, the special interests hypothesis
accounting for the the lack of a competition law until 1990 in Italy has not
been examined, nor the question of the optimality of the Italian pattern in the
competition law has been touched. I am performing now a political economy
analysis to cast some light on a potential root of ineﬃciency of the laissez faire
policy on this ground put in place in Italy; given the absence of clear sources
of identiﬁcation, the analysis is going to be predominantly qualitative, and it is
32One of the rare exceptions is Sjostrom (1998), who, however, in his discussion, conﬁrms
this deﬁcit.
10preceded by a review of the form of government and of the election and decision
making mechanisms in the relevant time interval.
The Italian State was formed in 1861 under the aegis of the Savoia dynasty,
which reigned, within a Constitutional Monarchy system, until the end of the
second world war. The legislative power was exerted collectively by the Senate,
whose members were appointed by the king, and by the House of Representa-
tives, directly elected by the citizens. A lot of restrictions were established in
order to circumscribe the electoral base, which, until 1882, included only ap-
proximately 2% of the overall population. The 1882 reform extended the right
to vote to all male citizens older than 21 and either possessing a minimum re-
quirement in terms of education or paying an amount of taxes higher than a
predetermined threshold; as an eﬀect, 6.2 % of the overall population could vote
in the 1882 elections. The male universal suﬀrage under proportional represen-
tation was established by the electoral laws of 1912, proposed by Giolitti, and
of 191933. However, just four years after, in 1923 the so-called ”Acerbo law”,
actually designed by Mussolini, introduced a majority premium, allowing the
coalition obtaining a relative majority in the election an absolutely majoritarian
representation in the Parliament. The abnormal entity of the premium induced
most of the commentators to regard the law as a regression from a representa-
tive to a plebiscitarian democracy34. The degeneration of the election system
during fascism became even more pronounced in the subsequent period. From
1928, the citizens were called only to ratify the candidates appointed by a newly
created institution, the “Great Council of the Fascism”, laying down the deﬁni-
tive transition to a plebiscitarian system, and the collapse of the representative
mechanism. After the second world war, the switch to a Republican system was
accompanied by the extension of the right to vote to women.35
A division of the Italian politics history into four periods is useful: until
1912, an elitarist democracy arose, characterized by the direct relation between
elector and elected; the link vanishes with the proportional system combined
with the male universal suﬀrage that informed the period 1912 to 1923. Then,
the fascism was characterized by the transition to a plebiscitarian system and
by an authoritarian attitude. Finally, after the war, a modern electoral system,
based on universal suﬀrage and proportional representation, emergered in the
Republican context.
The issue to be explored here concerns the degree to which special interests
in the relevant time periods for the present analysis informed the competition
policy. At ﬁrst, the applicability of the theories developed for the American
experience is veriﬁed; subsequently, country-speciﬁc vested interests theories
are developed and tested using historical evidence.
Many scholars regarded the agrarian interests as the driving force of North
American Antitrust. Agriculture pressure for reform was determined by the
33The 1912 law subordinated the right to vote to an age of at least 30, or to the involvement
in the military service, while the 1919 law extended it to all citizens above 21.
34Sabbatucci, G., ”Il suicidio della classe dirigente liberale: la legge Acerbo 1923-1924”, in
Sabbatucci (1995), p. 104.
35The overview is based on Sabbatucci (1995).
11increasing costs of transportation according to Stigler, and by the oligopsony
generated on their demand side in Boudreaux, Di Lorenzo and Parker’s view.
In Italy, transportation developed later, and the railroads network at ﬁrst very
small, and then managed by the State. The demand for agriculture products,
on the other hand, was not concentrated, as the indexes on industrial concen-
tration36 relative to food industry demonstrate. Furthermore, an investigation
on the supply chain of agricultural products shows that a signiﬁcant share of
agricultural products were sold directly by the farmers to the ﬁnal consumers37,
escaping the intermediation process often observed in the United States. Fi-
nally, the backwardness in the transportation system, persistent in Southern
Italy until 1940, reduced the dimensions of the markets, thus generating po-
tential for concentration and dominant positions, extensively employed, among
the agricultural sector itself. As a consequence, the hypothesis formulated by
Stigler and Boudreaux et alii displays a scarce match with the Italian history.
In fact, agrarian lobbies, expecially in Southern Italy characterized by the
institution of latifondo, 38might have organized a pressure on the government
against the adoption of the competition law. This hypothesis is grounded, and
can be considered as explanatory until the introduction of the male universal suf-
frage in 1910. Indeed, because of the previously mentioned reasons, agriculture
had developed around oligopolies in the Southern Italy; furthermore, interests
of agriculture were well organized in associations, whose voice was very much
heard by the Italian politics.
Stigler’s hypothesis of the inﬂuence of potential monopolists in opposing the
Antitrust law can be referred, in the Italian experience, both to the agrarian
interests, which have already been analyzed, and to the industrial sector, whose
presence was strong and inﬂuencial in the Italian history. The tight link devel-
oped between industry, bank and the state in the heavy industries protected by
the State can suggest a mixture of interests between politics and industry. The
well known Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto observed back in 1887 the plot
beteen politics and business, assessing that “As the State became the regulator
of the economic life of the country, the entrepreneur is led to neglect the hard
labor, that entails progress in the technology and in the economy, and instead
to rush to the capital [Rome] in the circle of the public authorities, with the
goal of obtaining some of the gifts that generously are poured from everywhere.
Indeed, they are aware that a single trait of feather of a minister, or even of
a simple reporter of a Parliamentary Commission, can give to an industry ad-
vantages that long years of the most intelligent and most constistent carried on
labor could not procure”39.
The economic history literature provides extensive evidences, or in some
cases suggestive clues, of the pursuit of special interests held by potential mo-
36See 5.
37See Zaninelli (1995).
38The latifondo ownership structure provide for few owners owning each huge ﬁelds, and
delegating the actual work to sharecroppers or workers through various forms of contracts.
39See Castronovo (1980), p. 66-67.
12nopolists, consisting in state aids to big industry in various forms40,a m o n g
which the lack of a competition law. Two signiﬁcant stories now outlined, among
the many documented by the literature. Piero Bastogi, an Italian banker and
entrepreneur, was the ﬁnance minister at the time of Italian uniﬁcation (1861).
After quitting the government, in 1862 he leaded a pool of capitalists that ob-
tained by a commission instituted in the Italian Parliament the management
of Southern Italy railroad system. In the board of the newly created company,
were sitting both the President and the secretary of the Parliamentary Com-
mission. A subsequent judicial inquire revealed that Bastogi had even hugely
brided the secretary of the Commission in exchange for his support. Despite his
judicial misfortune, Bastogi was eventually reelected in the Chamber and after-
wards appointed to the Italian Senate. The extent of his inﬂuence contributed
to the stop of the process of nationalization of the railroad system, realized only
in 1905, after his death.
Vincenzo Stefano Breda, originally from Padua, was elected in the Parlia-
ment in 1866. He developed a tight relation with the ﬁnance minister of that
time, Cambray-Digny, and signiﬁcant links with other members of the Parlia-
ment, that allowed him to successfully create the ”Società veneta per imprese e
costruzioni pubbliche” (Veneta Company for public works), an industry based
on state works in the infrastructure and building sectors. His net of connections
assures the company an amount of public purchases, accompanied by frequent
anticipations of the payment and by other forms of facilitations, that alltogether
yielded an average yearly proﬁt of 10% for the shareholders. The involvment of
t h eS t a t ew a se v e nm o r ei n t r u s i v ea tt h et i m eo ft h ec r e a t i o no ft h eT e r n i ,e x -
amined in greater details in the next section, of which Breda has been the ﬁrst
President. Emblematically, the proﬁts achieved by the Terni in 1897, whose
essentially exclusive customer was the public sector, are witnessed by Giulio
Prinetti, an entrepreneur from Milan who estimated them, at approximately
200% of the beared costs41, versus an average of about 30% for the ﬁrms pro-
ducing for the private sector.
Ferdinando Maria Perrone, leader of Ansaldo starting in 1908, is deﬁned
by his biographer Paride Rugaﬁori as a social broker, thanks to his ability in
constructing a network of connections. His strategy, consisting in the attribution
of highly remunerated tasks to employees recommended by the most inﬂuential
politicans, has been widely applied subsequently.
Bastogi’s, Breda’s and Perrone’s vicissitudes are suggestive of the inﬂuence
that industrialists, representative of big business, were able to exert within the
decision-making system. The relation between this aspect and the absence of
an antitrust policy, which by now might seem vague, is illustrated in greater
details in the next section42.
At the beginninng of the paragraph, the second source of potential inef-
ﬁciency, besides the prevalence of lobbies whose objectives are not coinciding
40For an extensive discussion on this point, see 5.
41See Castronovo (1980), p. 65.
42The story of Breda, Bastogi and Perrone is mainly based on Amatori-Colli (1999), ch.
1-3.
13with the public interest, has been identiﬁed in failures by the politicians, due
to their miopic view. The failures are deﬁned in this context as discrepeancies
in the evaluation of the ex ante eﬃciency of a certain provision between the
authority emanating it and subsequent analysis performed only on the basis of
information available to the decision-maker at the time of its deliberation. In a
sense, they can be interpreted as irrational behavior by the politicians, not mo-
tivated by anything but their inability to correctly forecast the impact of their
policy, given the information set available to them prior to the decision. For
various reasons, it appears very hard to estimate the extent of political mistakes
a c c o r d i n gt ot h i sd e ﬁnition, as both the available information set and the real
intention of the legislators are usually only imprecisely detectable. Therefore,
in the impossiblity of illustrating and testing a theory of political failures, the
topic is exhausted by reporting a citation from a well-known Italian economist,
Vilfredo Pareto, who at the end of the nineteenth century wrote: ”A singular
mania leads our governors to put their hands on everything, and a constant dis-
grace follows them, so that whatever they do, even with the best purposes, turns
out to have bad results. Naturally, Italy worked for the products with the small-
est comparative cost, and was prosperous. Nothing else could be done, but let
Italy pursue that pattern; however, the idea of changing the Italian nature came
to our governors’ mind. They sentenced the death of some industries, and pro-
moted others artiﬁcially - knowing that artiﬁcially now simply means through
the taxpayers’ money -, the only eﬀect of all that being that they destroyed a
great deal of the wealth of the country”43.
The connection between étatism and the absence of an Antitrust law might
at this point appear vague; it will be illustrated in greater details in the next
paragraph. In any case, Pareto’s view is disputed, and the next section of the
paper is challenging it. However, it represents a theory shared by most of the
laissez faire economists, and shows that many scholars have resorted to the
argument of political failure in their attempt at illustrating the ineﬃciency of
economic policy in the process of the Italian industrialization. There does not
exist an analogous argument, at least devloped by as much reknown personal-
ities, with reference to the American economic policy, a plausible reason being
that the optimal pattern is less disputable in a forefront country in the industrial
development process country than in a backward country.
Non economic reasons have been enumerated as the last possible reason for
social ineﬃciency. The American experience oﬀers a clear example of a non eco-
nomic reason that hasd lead to the adoption of antitrust, and has had a negative
impact on the American welfare: letting the small business to operate, freedom
of existing for small business. Translated into policy: preventing cost cutting
so that small business could stay alive regardless of their economic eﬃciency.
Economic impact of this is negative in the short run: you impose an oligopolistic
production and pricing policy, getting far from economic eﬃciency in terms of
both total surplus and productive eﬃciency.
43See Zamagni (1990), p. 207.
The connection between this thought and the Italian pattern of competition policy is high-
l i g h t e di nt h en e x ts e c t i o n .
14Overall, the evidence for an eﬀect, in favor of ineﬃciency, of the policy fail-
ure argument over the evolution of the Antitrust policy does not seem strong
in either of the two countries, being basically absent in the United States, and
very arguable and disputed in Italy. The impact of non-economic motives has
not been negligible in the United States, as the quote from Senator Sherman
cited in the previous section witnesses eloquently. Furthermore, evidence of the
action of special interests has been provided in previous studies related to the
United States. In conclusion, there is room for ineﬃciency in the American
Antitrust policy; the next section will provide a most exhaustive examination
to determine whether or not the special interests and the non economic reasons
were actually operating in the same direction of the collective welfare, or not.
On the other hand, the Italian pattern is suitable of a lobby-based explanation,
as illustrated in the previous analysis. A deeper question, though, arises, ex-
tending one step further, and having to do with the motivations for the state
intervention, which itself tends to generate distortions due to groups pressure
because of an incentive mechanism extensively explored in the political econ-
omy literature. The issue can be reformulated in the following terms: Given
the ex ante predictable negative impact of the lobbying activity in an economy
featuring state intervention, was such state intervention, ﬁnally leading to the
prevalence of anticompetitive public policies, still optimal? The next section is
devoted to a tentative answer to this question.
5A r g u m e n t s i n f a v o r o f e ﬃciency
The vested interest argument, more remarkable in Italy than in the United
States, leaves an issue open, which is the extent to which the Italian policy
of direct state intervention in the economy, inherently entailing the prevalence
in some cases of special over public interests outside the mechanisms of the
competitive economy, is still suitable of being considered eﬃcient.
The economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron derived a number of hy-
potheses about the patterns of European industrialization. In particular, he
assessed the positive correlation between the backwardness of a country and a
list of other variables, including the speed of its industrialization process, the
stress on producer goods as compared with consumer goods, the size of the
typical scale of plant and ﬁrm, the emphasis of up-to-date technologies, the im-
portance of the role of special institutional factors, such as banks or government,
in supplying capital and promoting industrialization, and ﬁnally the relevance
of ideologies in the shaping of policies and events44.
Oliver Williamson reached similar conclusions adopting an industrial orga-
nization perspective. His work has focused on the beneﬁts and limits of com-
petitive markets and the rationale for complex contracting arrangements and
hierarchical organizations. He assessed that large hierarchical arrangements,
aiding certain continuing relationships, constitute an institutional device that
increases eﬃciency by permitting specialization that requires special skills and
44See Sylla-Toniolo (1991), p. 5.
15capital. They provide the beneﬁcial lock of ”transaction speciﬁca s s e t s ”i na
single relation, within which they are most valuable. In a market economy,
similar goals can be achieved either through the costly self-enforceability or law
enforceability of the contract, or within a context of economies of throughput, to
use a Chandlerian term, requiring ipso facto a large market. Furthermore, the
relevance of transaction speciﬁc assets depends on the potential for substitabil-
ity of the second contractor, which is positively correlated with the dimension of
the economy, as the presence of multiple suppliers and multiple markets tends
to reduce the switching costs. As a consequence, Williamson’s theory predicts
that the advantages of the hierarchical structure, according to Williamson, oﬀ-
set its drawbacks, in terms of dilution of incentives to eﬃcient behavior, in
the most backward countries, featuring small markets, and imperfect judiciary
system. Large scale ﬁrms and State and bank intervention accomplish a hierar-
chical organization45. It now appears clear that Williamson and Gerschenkron
arguments get to an analogous landing.
The purpose of the present section is to apply the two theories to the ana-
lyzed contexts, to extend them, to explore their implications on the issue of the
eﬃciency of the adopted competition policies, and, ﬁnally, to test the validity
of the results.
5.1 The Italian situation
Before proceding in a sectorial discussion, some general statistical indicators are
presented:
Percentual composition of the GDP by productive sector
1861 1913 1938
Agriculture 46.1 37.6 26.6
Industry 18.4 24.9 30.3
Services 30.4 32.0 31.7
Source: Ercolani, P., ”Documentazione statistica di base” (Ba-
sic statistical documentation), in Fuà, G., ”Lo sviluppo economico
in Italia” (Economic development in Italy), Franco Angeli, Milano,
1969, reported in Zamagni (1990), p. 56.
Percentual composition of the labor force in the manufacturing sector
45The overview of Williamson’s theory is based on C. Knick Harley, ”Substitution for prereq-
uisites: endogenous institutions and comparative economic history”, in Sylla-Toniolo (1991),
p. 33-35.
161911 1927 1937
Food and beverage 13.8 11.4 14
Textiles 22.9 23 17.6
Metal 1.9 3.2 3
Mechanical 16.7 18 24.9
Chemical 2.6 3 4.5
Clothing 8.9 10.9 8.3
Source:Zamagni, V., ”A Century of Change: Trends in the Com-
position of the Italian Labor Force, 1888-1981”, in Historical Social
Research”, n. 44, 1987, reported in Zamagni (1990), p. 52.
Added value of the industrial sectors, 1878 - 1911
1911 Annual Total # of Average # of
growth rate employees employees
1878-1911 per ﬁrm




Metals 90 5.7 42663 38
Mechanical 843 5.3 269372 17
Chemical 158 6.9 19083 21
Food and beverages 797 1 295286 5
Sources: Zamagni (1990), pp. 114-115.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the Italian economic structure cru-
cially hinged on agriculture, whose incidence on the national GDP has exceeded
those of the industrial and of the service sectors until after the ﬁrst world war.
Regional diﬀerences persisted in the long-run: the cultivation techniques of the
Pianura padana, in the North of the country, were far the most advanced of
the country, supported by the prevalence of incentivating contractual schemes
of ownership and management, such as small property and rent contracts. The
most backward Mezzogiorno featured the outdated latifondi, huge plots of land
under a single ownership often only partially exploited by the scarcely moni-
tored salaried workers. As far as international comparisons are concerned, Italy
claimed the supremacy within Europe in terms of productivity per area, while
the Italian productivity per worker hardly attained the 60 % of the British level,
reﬂecting an excess supply of labor force46.
The incipit of the textile industry dates back to the sixteenth century. It is
unanimously deemed the most traditional Italian industrial activity, or, as most
contemporary scholars used to deﬁne it, a ”natural industry”. Italy dominated
46See Zamagni (1990), pp. 75-98.
17in the silk production, characterized by a tight link with the agricultural sector,
with a share of the world production oscillating at around one third in the time
period between the 1850 until after the ﬁrst world war. The prevalence of the
oﬀer of raw or spinned products, observed in the 1880s, gradually vanished,
replaced by the oﬀer of the ﬁnal weaved products. Indeed, specialization and
technological process characterizing the ﬁrst decade of 1900, lead most ﬁrms
to cover all the phases of the production process, including the ﬁnal weaving
stage, the major contributor to the value added of the industry. The high degree
of mechanization and the low labor cost explain the impressive success of the
Italian silk on the world markets. Available estimation of the productivity of
the silk industry indicate the Italian leadership, shared with Britain and the
United States, at the international level. the capital ﬂow generated by silk
contributed to the development of other industries in the North of Italy. A
major percentage of the production was concentrated in the industrial district
around Como, and fragmented in a plethora of small ﬁrms, who could exploit the
organizational advantages of the district. Despite its measurement problems,
due to the signiﬁcance of household production and of very small ﬁrms not
captured by the available data, the industrial concentration in silk soared during
the spell, but did not attain a considerable level. The importance of the skill
sector lies also in its capability of generating both positive externalities, in
terms of technology and of labor organization, and a signiﬁcant capital ﬂow,
that helped the industrial development of Northern Italy47.
The wool industry clustered into three major industrial districts, Prato,
Schio Valdagno, and Biella. The dimension of the wool-mills, on average more
relevant than the silk-mills, register nevertheless a very high variance. As a
tendency, the capital intensive weaving activity was performed in bigger facto-
ries. Marzotto, the main entrepreneur in the ﬁeld, employed 2000 people at the
beginning of the twentieth century in his vertically integrated ﬁrm, which dis-
posed of 10 % of the wool spindles endowment of the country. Overall, the wool
industry registered a noticeable expansion throughout the period, peaking in
1914, when spindles jumped to 240000 q, with a 70000 q, or 40%, increase with
respect to 1907, and weavers attained 340000 q, a growth 314000 q compared
to seven years before. Despite these improvements, on the eve of the ﬁrst world
war, imports overwhelmed exports by 67%. The control of a large share of the
market by a few giants should not induce to think of them as dominant ﬁrms
strictu sensu, since a myriad of smaller factories imposed a competitive conduct
within the whole sector.
In the twenty years between 1880 and 1900, the cotton-mills rapidly out-
spread; spindles rose from 2 to 4 millions, while looms more than doubled, from
70000 to 160000. Technological accomplishments were accompanied by con-
siderable productivity enhancements, that allowed Italy to reduce the lag with
respect to the most advanced countries, and to rank third in terms of produc-
tivity, following right after United States and Britain. Lombardy hosted more
than two thirds of cotton factories, including the two giants, Crespi and Can-
47See Zamagni (1990), pp.120-121, and Amatori-Colli (1999), pp.69-70.
18toni. Analogously to the wool sector, the main companies had to face smaller
challengers, able to achieve the same quality, which kept production and pricing
policies at the competitive level.
The food industry acquired at the end of the nineteenth century a rather
merchantile characterizations that assimilated it to the American food industry.
The major companies, such as Barilla, Cirio, Buitoni, Galbani, established a
profound connection with their suppliers in the agricultural sector, and, as a
tendency, preserved their original a small dimension. The high average quality
standard of the products contributed to international reputation of the Italian
food industry, which in 1911 accounted for almost the 20% of the national
industrial production, and employed on average 5 workers48.
A number of labor intensive light industrial productions were organized in
small ﬁrms grouped in industrial districts. The condition of the small business
was quite homogenous across diﬀerent industrial sectors. Therefore, only an il-
lustrative example of one of these, relative to the shoe industry, is now presented.
The industrial census of 1911 revealed that, out of the 26000 shoe factories
spread in Italy, only 400 employed more than ten workers. The average pro-
ductivity of the sector is estimated in 1911 at one sixth of the metalmechanical
industry, with a further shrinkage to one twelfth accounting for the widespread
home production. In spite of these drawbacks, the best known shoes industrial
districts, among which Macerata, in the region of Marche, displayed an impres-
sive commercial dynamism, and managed to sell their products on the European
and on the American markets; in 1911, shoes account for more than 2% of the
total value of the Italian exports49.
The phenomenon of small business has always been very pronounced in Italy,
and has pervaded many Italian industrial sectors, among which textile and food,
already discussed, plus wood, mechanics, clothing and furniture. The share
of the labor force employed in small business, including priece workers and
entrepreneurs working at home, oscillates in the time period between 35% in
1911 and 42% in 1920.
The energy industry exploited the abundant Italian natural resources in
terms of waterfalls to experience the use of hydroelectricity. The ﬁrst Italian
electric ﬁrm was founded by Giuseppe Colombo in 1881. The extreme cap-
ital intensity required in the generation of electricity explains the signiﬁcant
investment allocations in the sector, which accounted for over 4% of the over-
all Italian investments in plant and ﬁxed installations in the spell 1880-1920.
Notwithstanding the seeming fragmentation, suggested by the activity of 264
ﬁrms in 1915, the sector was indeed monopolized: sixty percent of the total cap-
ital was controlled by twenty companies, holding also 57% of the plant values
and 47% of the installed power; more importantly, the government assigned ex-
clusive concessions, on a local basis, for the provision of electricity, in exchange
for a low canon; furthermore, universal banks, in particular Comit and Credit,
48The overview of the Italian situation of silk, cotton, wool and alimentary sectors is based
on Zamagni (1990), pp.114-115,.118-124, and Amatori-Colli (1999), pp.21-26, 69-75.
49See Annuario Statistico Italiano (Italian Statistical Annals), 1911.
19controlled a vast fraction of the industry50. The stemming regional monopolies,
among which Edison in Milan and in most of the Lombardy, and Sade (Adriatic
company of electricity) in Veneto and Emilia, dominated the Italian scene51.
The iron industry at the end of the nineteenth century lied in a very primi-
tive plight. The steel-works and foundries company Terni was founded in 1884
under the State impulse with the objective of endowing Italy with a complete
cycle of steel, from pig iron to ﬁnite products. It employed very up-to-date tech-
nologies, which excluded any continuitiy with prior iron industry experiences.
The State maintained a direct engagement in the operation, by participating
in the initial capital investment, by guaranteeing a ﬂow of future purchases for
military reasons, particularly war ships, and by anticipating large amounts of
money in order to help the investments. As a result of the State intervention,
the universal banks perceived the sector as not excessiviely risky; thus, the
General Bank, the Credit and the National Bank decided to enter it as share-
holders or as lender. In 1887, the Terni, at grips with a profound crisis that
threatened its own existence, was sustained by the National Bank, through a
renewed lending operation, and by the State, through further anticipations on
future public purchases, in the frame of a very costly operation. At the end of
the nineteenth century, a set of new plants joined the hiterto monopolistic iron
industry, giving rise to the so-called iron trust, assembling the quasi-totality
of high-quality-output ﬁrms suitable to supply the advanced shipbuilding, me-
chanical and electromechanical factories. The six industries in the oligopoly,
Terni, Elba, Siderurgica di Savona, Ligure metallurgica, Ferriere Italiane and
Ilva, were in the hands of the universal banks Credit and COMIT. When the
deep recession of 1907 stroke the trust, the Bank of Italy subsidized the sector
to assure its survival, and established a supervising consortium in charge of
determining prices and market shares. In this context, the production of steel,
pushed by the state demand, grew rapidly, from 480382 t in the period 1886-
1890 to 2751390 t in the time period 1906-1910. . In spite of all the progresses,
Russia, another latecomer, performed comparatively better in the same spell:
indeed, after having trailed Italy until the turn of the century, overcame it, and
by 1913 produced 5 millions of tons of steel. To conclude the analysis with a
quantitative remark, in 1913, the Italian steel production amounted to a third
of the Austrian, a ﬁf t ho ft h eF r e n c h ,an i n t ho ft h eE n g l i s h ,a n dat w e n t i e t ho f
the German52.
The foundation of the ﬁrst modern Italian mechanical industry dated back
to 1874, when the Cantoni-Krumm initiated its activity of construction and
reparation of machinery for the cotton industry, shortly followed by the Falck,
w h i c ho p e r a t e dad i v e r s i ﬁcation in the mechanical production. The Marelli,
started in 1905, marked the outset of the electromechanical industry. The two
sectors proceeded along parallel development patterns, remaining independent
50In 1911, when Comit and Credit held directly more than 50% of the capital of Edison,
ﬁve of the eight members of the board represented the two banks, and both the President and
the Vice President were aﬃliated to the Credit.
51See Amatori-Colli (1999), p. 94 and pp. 147-152.
52See Amatori-Colli (1999), p.117.
20of the State aids and exhibiting a low level of concentration.
The belated appearance of the chemical industry in the Italian industrial
scenario is ascribable to the lack of tariﬀ barriers, and to the consequential
exposure to the the challenges from German powerful rivals, ﬁrst of which Bayer.
Until 1890, the output was limited to a set of basic products used in agricolture,
mainly fertilizer. Its expansion irrational and chaotic expansion of the sector
was irrational and chaotic. At the eve of the ﬁrst world war, the two main ﬁrms,
the Colla Concimi and the Unione Concimi, controlled roughly two thirds of the
national market, while the rest was shared among very small local producers.
The two giants merged in the 1920, originating the undisputed chemical leader
Montecatini, whose twine with the Italian government, in a continuous operation
of do ut des, has come to symbolize the Italian State- driven industrial progress.
With the creation of Fiat and of Alfa Romeo, at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, the Italian automobile industry moved its ﬁrst steps. Its succes-
sive expansion beneﬁted of the governmental intervention as a regular customer,
purchasing military vehicles, and other transportation equipments. The adop-
tion of the mass production paradigm revolutionized the labor organizational
models within ﬁrms. During his frequent visits to the United States, Giovanni
Agnelli, founder, chairman and executive of the Fiat, was often hosted by Henri
Ford, in order to observe the most successful application of the Taylorian scheme,
and eventually to import it.
Five main works about industrial concentration stand out. They all deal
with the scantiness and lack of precision of the collected data, and their results
are contradictory. Vinci53 and Saibante54 inappropriately employ the Gini in-
dex, which measures the size distribution failing to account for the number of
ﬁrms. Rossi and Toniolo55 use hardly relaible data, obtaining implausibly high
values for the parameters; furthermore, given their macroeconomic perspective,
they provide aggregate measures, and do not examine the singular industries.
Giannetti, Federico and Toninelli56 provide an estimation based on data from
the yearbook of Italian joint stock companies, published every two years from
1907 onwards, listing all companies with a capitalization higher than a threshold,
established in one million lire. They choose to adopt the Herﬁndhal-Hirschman
index, which appropriately measures the concentration, but does not describe
satisfactorily the extent of market power exerted by a ﬁrm, as it does not cap-
ture agreements and concertations among ﬁrms that trigger cartelization, and,
de facto, an oligopolistic production and pricing policies by an industry. Ac-
cording to this argument, since the focus of the analysis concerns market power,
the index is biased downward, underestimating what could be deﬁned as the ”ef-
fective concentration”. On the other hand, the restriction to stock companies,
a fortiori with the imposition of a threshold in terms of a capitalization, tends
to bias the results upward, as it omits both other types of common partnerships
53See Vinci (1918).
54See Giannetti et alii (1994), p. 493.
55See Rossi-Toniolo (1992).
56See Giannetti et alii (1994).
21among medium and small ﬁrms57, and the least capitalized stock companies.
The most relevant result, for the purpose of the present paper, are reported
in the following table:
Herﬁndhal index of concentration for some Italian industries as measured by
Giannetti, Federico and Toninelli
Sector 1907 1911 1922 1927 1936
Coal mining 0.63267 0.383091 0.262855 0.286669 0.317483
Electricity and gas 0.029315 0.029161 0.027961 0.035581 0.050406
Iron and steel 0.043025 0.081425 0.16312 0.105021 0.128799
Chemicals 0.043443 0.04497 0.03263 0.035046 0.180774
Motor vehicles 0.043378 0.171767 0.515971 0.460775 0.414849
Food 0.05271 0.062357 0.039846 0.029065 0.052784
Textile 0.013998 0.015279 0.020922 0.017386 0.019904
Overall
Mining, metallurgy
and chemicals 0.014447 0.020697 0.036741 0.052293 0.043782
Mechanical engineering 0.027914 0.027919 0.046351 0.052892 0.047231
Manufacturing
except the two above 0.007707 0.009507 0.009428 0.010803 0.012243
Source: Giannetti et alii (1994), p. 496.
The authors conclude that the Italian stage of industrial development in
the early twentieth century was not characterized by the dimensional dualism
between small and competitive light industry and big heavy industry, which
was commonly assessed in the previous studies on the ﬁeld; on the contrary, it
indeed featured medium or small industry quite homogenously across sectors.
The ﬁndings crucially depend on the evaluation of the eﬀects of the bias on
their validity. The authors believe that the two biases, operating in opposite
directions, end up canceling out. Empirical observations appear to contrast the
claim. First of all, evidence of cartelization and creation of trusts pertains only
to some sectors, the most signiﬁcant of which, as previously mentioned, is the
iron and steel. Secondly, the various sectors are not equally capital-intensive.
It is therefore likely that industries requiring lower capital investments, such as
the textile or the food industries, are not suﬃciently represented in the data,
as a higher percentage of ﬁrms in these industries either were not joint-stock
companies, or had a low level of capital. Furthermore, some potentially capital
intensive sectors featured the contemporary presence of big ﬁrms producing tech-
nologically up-to-date products, and smaller ﬁrms, whose output was absorbed
by customers requiring lower quality products. Sometimes, the two products
were not substitutable. For example, the small iron and steel industry thriving
in Lombardy at the beginning of the twentieth century were not able to supply
the Italian army with iron of suﬃcient quality to build ships.
57See Giannetti et alii (1994), p. 494.
22The results obtained by the authors are therefore questionable both on a
scale perspective, and with respect to an intrasectorial comparison. It appears
that the results underestimate market power for the technologically advanced
subset of the iron and steel industry, because of the twofold eﬀect of the emer-
gence of a trust among the ﬁrms producing highest quality products and of the
prevalent intrasectorial non subtitability previously described. The exact same
argument can be applied to the motor vehicle industry in 1907; the extension of
the demand for innovative products, such as car and war vehicles, to the detri-
ment of more traditional products, entails a composition eﬀect that explain the
reconciliation between the measured index and the degree of eﬀective market
power. The ﬁndings for the chemical industry ﬁt the above illustrated histor-
ical evidence, while electricity, despite its fragmentation on a national scale,
was a locally monopolistic market, as a consequence of the concession system
put in place by the state. Finally, the traditional labor intensive industries,
such as food and textile, are probably underrepresented in the data, from which
the smallest are excluded. Therefore, the estimates of market power for these
sectors are biased upward.
Unfortunately, given the unavailability of more precise data, the most accu-
rate approximation of the market power index may be given by the Giannelli,
Federico and Toninelli index, corrected through the qualitative observations just
listed. Some implications may also be derived by Zamagni’s measurement of the
average number of employees per ﬁrm, reported in table 2, while Rossi and To-
niolo concentration estimates do not allow any disentaglement across sectors.
E v e ni nt h ep r e s e n c eo fr e m a r k a b l ed i ﬀerences, the works agree over the in-
tuitively plausible fact that, at the end of the nineteenth century and at the
beginning of the twentieth, the capital intensive heavy industries, or, according
to Chandler’s classiﬁcation, the Second Industrial Revolution industries, were
more concentrated and had a more signiﬁcant tendency toward market power
production and pricing policies than the traditional light industries did.
Given the analysis, it seems fair to claim that an antitrust law would have
been neutral with respect to the light industry, already fragmented and compet-
itive, while it would have aﬀected, more or less deeply, the more concentrated
heavy industry. Therefore, the eﬃciency analysis boils down to the counterfac-
tual evaluation of the impact by an hypothetical law enforcing competition on
the heavy industry sector. It is now presented.
As noted, the traditional industries, such as textile, food, light machinery,
deﬁned “natural” by the laissez-faire free-traders, displayed a gradual and au-
tonomous development; indeed, these industires, generally directly supplied by
the agricultural sector, did not beneﬁt of any speciﬁc form of state intervention.
The free trade policy, coupled with the economic slogan “small is beautiful”58,
prevailed in Italy until 1875, as long as the right wing represented the Parlia-
mentary majority. Until 1880, Italian industrial panorama was twofold. The
heavy industry lagged well behind its American and many of its European coun-
terparts, and contributed to the Italian GDP for a very small portion, while the
58See Castronovo (1980), p. 30
23light industry, albeit fragmented, was quite advanced in the North of Italy. In
the 1880, at the time in which many American States were approving their
Antitrust Laws, Italy did not need one, since it would not have signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced the industrial structure. As a left wing government came into power
at the beginning of the eighties, the heavy industry issue was faced, by adopt-
ing a policy of state intervention in favor of the creation of the heavy industry.
The distinguishing traits of such economic policy towards heavy industries were
articulated into three main directions. It contributed directly in the capital ac-
cumulation of a selected group of ﬁrms through participation or concession of
loans under favorable terms; in its capacity of last resort lender, it guaranteed,
also through the Bank of Italy after its creation in 1893, the non-statal lenders
or shareholders; ﬁnally, it was the customer of many heavy industries, for a sub-
set of which the State demand largely oﬀset the private one, as the case of Terni
discussed in the previous section unquestionably shows. The data on the public
expenditure reported in the following table at a ﬁrst glance do not appear to
reﬂect this upward tendency. However, Vera Zamagni, who computed the ﬁg-
ures, identiﬁes the escalation, and points out at the boom of public expenditure
with the left wing, culminated with the 20% of the GDP in 1889, followed by
oscillations around 19% until 1897, by a slow descent down to 14.2% in 1907,
and ﬁnally by a new peak to 18% in the years immedaiately preceeding the ﬁrst
world war59. Indeed, in any case, further investigations on the composition of
the public expenditure are required to verify more accurately the assertion that
the incidence of State intervention on heavy industry increased in the spell.
Public expenditure in Italy in the years 1866-1913
Percentage of the Percentage composition of
ratio between total total expenditure
State expenditure public works edu redistribution military
and GNP
1866 16.8 3.2 2.3 0.4 33.9
1870 14.4 14.2 3.2 0.3 14.1
1872 13.1 15.7 3.5 0.5 12.8
1880 13.7 13.3 5.0 0.5 14.9
1890 18.4 12.9 5.6 0.5 15.9
1900 16.2 8.2 6.5 1.0 15.0
1906 16.1 10.8 7.4 2.3 14.3
1912 18.3 11.4 8.7 2.1 21.1
1913 17.7 7.7 2.4 22.1
Source: Zamagni,, p. 210.
There is not a consensus among scholars on the entity and on the composition
of public expenditures. Valerio Castronovo60 estimates in more than a fourth,
59See Zamagni (1990), p. 210.
60See Castronovo (1980), p. 65.
24and increasing over time, the ratio of military expenditure to the overall State
budget in 1888. Given that the Ministry for war absorbed a relevant slice of
the public purchases from the heavy industry, this result better ﬁts the previous
ﬁndings.
Alexander Gerschenkron’s thesis of substitution for prerequisites, according
to which the development of countries characterized by relative industrial back-
wardness is boosted by the substitutive insitutions, such as the banks and the
government, that side the traditional free-market institutions, is in this context
strongly supported by historical evidence. However, the question of whether or
not the State intervention was actually a condicio sine qua non for the prosper-
ing of heavy industry has still to be addressed. The most obvious alternative to
State intervention is the market-enhanced development; in the speciﬁc instance
of highly capital intensive industries, single capitalists usually not disposing of
as u ﬃcient availability of resources, either the stock market or the banks are
necessary. However, the Italian capital market at the end of the nineteenth
century, despite its growing dynamism, was at an early stage of development.
Even under the assumption, still to be discussed, that the investments in the
heavy industry would have been proﬁtable in the long-run, the potential in-
vestors’ imperfect informational set relative to the performances of absolutely
new industries, coupled with uncertainties towards capital market institution,
a fortiori because of its young age, rendered the ex ante perception unclear.
Naturally, the new industries were supposed to bear high production costs in
the short-run, for many reasons, among which the scarce know-how, the spell
for the amortization of the ﬁxed costs, and, last but not least, the need to cre-
ate a market ex novo and the consequent limited dimensions of the initial one.
To conjugate high production costs and proﬁtability, high prices are required.
However, because of both the presence of international competitors, which the
tariﬀs were not able to deter, and the usual eﬀect of declining demand associ-
ated with price rising, it is possible to deduce that short-run proﬁtability was
chimerical. The banks may represent an alternative source of capital ﬂow to the
industry. However, on their turn, they were afraid to engage in long term and
uncertain investments, and to expose to the risks of volatility and of failure of
the projects, which really happened in many occasions. While State intervention
in the industry capital and through loans at favorable terms oﬀers a direct and
immediate solution to the ﬁnancing problem, its insurance of a market for the
output of the industry or as a last resort lender does not. Indeed, the problem
of enforceability of the promises of the government should be solved. It is clear
that, while the single capitalists would not have the force to impose to the State
the fullﬁllment of its promises, the big banks did. Thus, a consequence of the
State intervention in the heavy industry in the three above speciﬁed directions
was that the big banks, which could exert pressure on the State so that it full-
ﬁlled its obligations, intervened in the Italian development. The conclusion is
that the expansion of the heavy industry would not have been possible without
the State intervention, which triggered the banks ﬂow of ﬁnancing, too.
The reasononing leads to some interesting conclusions related to the An-
titrust law. The development of heavy industry had to be accompanied by a
25set of policies that minimize investors’ risks and lead to an acceptable expected
level of proﬁtability, despite the high production costs, due to comparative gaps
that ﬁrms had to bear in the short run. Otherwise, investors, as argued before,
would not have ﬁnanced the project, and the only left over alternative would
have consisted in a State-owned industry. The State intervention as last re-
sort lender and as privileged customer aimed precisely at assuring a suﬃcent
expected utility to a portion of the investors so that they could ultimately par-
ticipate in the investment. The eﬀect of an Anititrust law is to redistribute the
surplus from the industry to the consumers; thus, its eﬀect would operate in
the opposite direction. As a consequence, an Antitrust law would have made it
more diﬃcult, probably impossible, to develop the heavy industry.
After establishing that a counterfactual Antitrust law would have been neu-
tral with respect to the light industries, and would have negatively aﬀected the
artiﬁcially forced development of the heavy industry, it is legitimate to conclude
that the adoption of an Antitrust rule would not have been optimal as long as
it is reasonable to assert that the State organized construction of a powerful
heavy industry system in Italy actually was an optimal strategy. The last step
of the analysis is then devoted to an evaluation of the plausibility of the latter
assertion.
At ﬁrst, it is worth remarking what has been previously pointed out: because
of the imperfections in the capital market and the signiﬁcance of the role of the
State as a customer of the heavy industry within a context of a small market,
the necessity of the intervention of the public sector does not imply, per se,
the eﬃciency of the strategy of development of the industry. The issue can
be rephrased by assessing that State intervention was required to expand the
market for the heavy industry and to allow to add to long term proﬁtability,
under the assumption that it is achieved, the short term proﬁtability.
Speciﬁcally, in order to gauge the actual social long term proﬁtability, it
is suﬃcient to compute the potential net social gain from the soaring of heavy
industry, meanwhile seizing further causes, beyond the already mentioned phase-
displacement between the short term and the long term, for the unfeasibility of
the traditional market approach.
The most common type of market failure is represented by externalities,
which in this story appear to play a major role. It is reasonable to identify at
least two main sources of externalities in the process of creation of the Italian
heavy industry. The still high transportation and connection-establishing costs
raised the price of output of the foreign heavy industry utilized as inputs by a
variety of light industry ﬁrms. The development of heavy industry, after the
initial adjustment stage, would have eventually ruled out these costs, ultimately
dropping the price of output, and thus generating a positive eﬀect for the de-
manders of these goods. Secondly, the spillover eﬀect triggered by the creation
of a powerful industrial system would beneift Italy; most remarkably, the diﬀu-
sion of a technology, of an organization and of new frontiers for the markets, all
generated by the second industrial revolution, would beneﬁt the overall Italian
economy.
Another reason for the optimality of the development could be classiﬁed as a
26rather political-strategical reason. As Europe was disintegrating, it would have
been dangerous for the industries that were customer of the heavy industry to
have to depend from foreign countries for the provision of raw material necessary
for its production. The disintegration would have really been dangerous, at that
point, for the whole Italian industrial system.
Concluding, externalities, non economic facotrs and phase-displacement be-
tween short run and long run proﬁtability have determinantly contribute not
to attract Italian private investors in the Italian capital intensive industries,
notwithstanding the social beneﬁts potentially achievable by the overall econ-
omy through them.
5.2 The American situation
The American industrial apparatus registered a sizable expansion at the half of
the nineteenth century, when historians usually spot the transformation of the
hitherto agricultural United States into an industrial country.
The following sectorial overhaul, extensively drawing on Chandler (1990),
purposedly casts some light on the entrepreneurial environment that the com-
petition policy was supposed to aﬀect.
The electrical equipment industry developed in the 1880s and concentrated
production in a few plants. The Thomson-Houston merged with Edison General
Electric, and formed the General Electric Company in 1892. General Electric
and Westinghouse formed a patent pool in 1896, and came to dominate the
American electrical manufacturing industry. In the telephone sector, Western
Electric developed in that same time period.
The American entrepreneurs in metal achieved an equally quick develop-
ment. In ferrous metals, Andrew Carnegie had completed what was at the time
the world’s largest integrated Bessemer rail mill by installing blast furnaces in
Pittsburgh. The impressive output of steel in the 1880s and early 1990s marks
the beginning of the modern American steel industry. in nonferrous metals the
transformation resulted from the perfecting in 1891 of a high-voltage genera-
tor that made possible electrolitic reﬁning. In that year the construction of
ﬁve giant copper reﬁneries began a major transformation of that industry. In
electrolytic copper reﬁning the minimum eﬃcient scale was so great that only
ﬁfteen industries were built in the United States before World War II. Indeed
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company inaugurated the American oil adven-
ture. In 1870, the wide corporation embodying Rockefeller and some partners
boasted the world supremacy in terms of dimension. By 1910, eight integrated
oil companies - Standard Oil, Texaco, Gulf Oil, Associated Oil, Union Oil of Cal-
ifornia, Shell Oil, Tide Water Oil and Sun Oil - were listed among the nations’
two hundred largest industrial enterprises, and Pure Oil grazed the inclusion in
the same list. As a consequence, the industry was transformed into an oligopoly
prior to the judicial ruling prescribing dissolution of Standard Oil, in the after-
math of the Antitrust Law. During the second decade of the twentieth century,
27both old and new members of the domestic oligopoly grew through vertical in-
tegration; a relevant fraction of them was absorbed by the domestic market,
whose rapid growth was thwarted only by the Great Depression. Between 1913
and 1915, the former Standard Oil companies became price leaders in their
own regional marketing areas. As the Federal Trade Commission pointed out
in 1920, ”in most of the marketing areas east of the Rocky Mountains, Stan-
dard companies usually take the lead in announcing price changes, while other
companes follow”. The leaders based their prices on their costs, reﬂecting both
capacity and demand, meanwhile caring of keeping the prices high enough for
the smaller ﬁrms to report proﬁts. Only in the worst years of the depression,
from 1931 to 1935, the industry experienced a severe price war, with discount-
ings and rebates. Otherwise, leaders had little incentives to cut prices: not only
was the demand for petroleum products relatively inelastic, but the Standard
companies were sensitive to the accusation of price cutting, which had been a
major charge against Standard Oil in the Antitrust case of 1911. Indeed, as
the Federal Trade Commission observed in 1920, competition is more directed
to developing facilities for getting business than obtaining it by underselling.
Between 1921 and 1926, the share controlled by the Standard Group in the
domestic market fell from an estimated 50-55% to 37-40%. Even though esti-
mates for the group are not available for the period immediately following 1926,
they do exist for individual ﬁrms. Between 1926 and 1938, the share of Jersey
Standard in its domestic marketing territories dropped from 46.1% to 24.3%, of
the Atlantic Reﬁning from 44.5% to 21.9%, and of Standard of California from
28.7% to 17.7%. By the 1920s, the transformation from monopoly to modern
oligopoly was complete. In the domestic market, the leading oil companies made
no formal agreements about price and production. Abroad, it was only after the
oil glut of the late 1920s that Jersey Standard, and later Socony, Texaco, Gulf,
and Atlantic Reﬁning, attempted, with varying success, to implement written
agreements to stabilize price and output. The increased competition for market
share at home and abroad encouraged the oil companies to invest in research
and development. In 1921, the oil industry employed only 159 scientiﬁcp e r s o n -
nel, well below the number employed in chemicals, electrical machinery, rubber,
and transportation equipment61.
In rubber, improvements in the technology of production brought signiﬁcant,
but not comparable, cost advantages. The industrial major outputs consisted
in apparel, industrial items, and tires. At the end of the nineteenth century,
the attempt at the control of price and production and at combination ﬁnally
culminated in the formation in 1892 of an industry-wide holding company for
each of the two major product lines, the United States Rubber Company for
apparel, and the Mechanical Rubber Company for industrial products. In both
subindustries, the main companies, in spite of their voluntary exclusion from
the combinations, eventually thrived. The voracious demand for tires brought
about by the birth of the automobile industry further transformed the rubber
industry at the beginning of the twentieth century, quickly creating a global
61See Chandler (1990), pp. 92-104.
28oligopoly. In the United States, two new ﬁrms, Firestone and Goodyear, stood
out in the production of tires, soon followed by Goodrich and United States
rubber. The latter invested in research and development more than than the
former; overall, in research intensity, rubber was second only to chemicals. There
is little readily available data on price leadership in the industry, although a
recent study indicates that in replacement tires, prices tended to move broadly
in line, and the Goodyear wholesale list served as a standard62.
The paper industry adopted a parallel development pattern, with the estab-
lishment of a company, in the speciﬁc instance the International Paper Company,
in charge of the coordination of the market shares and of the pricing policies. In
the speciﬁc instance, the holding, named International Paper Company, headed
slowly towards the centralization of its administration and the rationalization
of its production.
The glass industry exhibited a steadily pronounced level of concentration.
The Pittsburgh Plate Glass company opened the way in the production of plate
glass using new highly capital intensive technologies, which overwhelmed the
handicraft methods adopted by the traditional ﬁrms, such as the United States
Glass Company. Entrepreneurs of the windows compartment strived after the
cartelization of the sector since 1880, when the American Window Manufacturer
Association was established. However, after many unsuccessful attempts, most
undertakings resorted to the idea of a holding company, constituted in 1899
under the name of American Window Glass Company. In the aftermath of the
suit by the Antitrust regulators in 1910, the holding was compelled to split, and
had to face the challenges of both the recently created Libbey - Owens, and of
the old Pittsburgh Plate Glass.
A new technology for the aluminium production, invented by Hall and Her-
ault, was at ﬁrst exploited by the Pittsburgh Reduction Company, in its gigantic
plant constructed at Niagara Falls in 1896. Renamed Alcoa, or Aluminium Com-
pany of America, in 1907, the ﬁrm boasted since then of a monopolistic position
on the American market, never scratched by the Antitrust regulation.
Prosperity in the copper industry was favored by innovations dating back
to the early 1890s. The enterprises of the sector clustered in a well established
oligopoly, composed of Anaconda Copper, Phelphs Dodge, American Smelting
and Reﬁning, Kennecott and American Metal.
Andrew Carnegie opened the ﬁrst estabishment adopting the modern productivity-
enhancing technologies in steel processing. The large dimension of the steel
market determined a larger optimal, and also actually observed since the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, participation in the original oligopoly. In
1889, three entrepreneurs combined to form the Illinois Steel Company, the
main Carnegie’s competitor. During the 1880s, Carnegie Steel and Illinois Steel
expanded through diversiﬁcation, dwindling dramatically the costs. The price
of steel rails at Pittsburgh plummeted 67.50$ a ton in 1880 from the 29.25$
of 1889; by the late 1890s, Carnegie total costs had fallen to 11.25$, while its
proﬁt, standing at 7 Million $ in 1897, soared to 11 million $ in 1898, and
62See Chandler (1990), pp. 105-112.
29eventually topped $40 millions in 1900, in the aftermath of a sharp increase
in demand that raised steel prices to 28.12$ a ton. A number of organizations
born in the 1890s as trade associations trasformed, starting in 1898, into indus-
try wide holding companies. These included American Steel & Wire, National
Tube, American Steel Hope and American Bridge. In February 1901, under the
aegis of Morgan, American investment banker leader, Carnegie Steel and Fed-
eral Steel merged to create the United States Steel, in what is deemed as the
most impressive combination of American industrial history. The challengers,
realizing their likely diﬃculties in competing with the leading giant, joined it,
thus extending the merger to a handful of other ﬁrms, such as American Steel &
Wire, National Tube, American Sheet Steel, American Steel Hoop, and Ameri-
can Tin-Plate. Within a short time, Shelby Steel and Tube, American Bridge,
and the Rockefeller-owned Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines aggregated.
The resulting entreprise, unique in American industry, was by far the world’s
largest industrial corporation. Only Standard Oil came close. By 1917, its assets
of $2,449.5 million were more than four times those of Standard Oil, and nearly
eight times those of the second largest steel company, Betlehem Steel. The new
company remained a holding company, failing to accomplish the step towards
productive rationalizations that the new big structure would allow. Under the
leadership of the banker Herbert Gary, output was lowered and prices raised,
a policy that, in spite of the beneﬁts for small producers, provided with the
opportunity of surviving, ultimately revealed itself as noxious for United States
Stell, which lost its dominant position on the market63.
Branded packaged products marked a revolution in purchasing activity, and
consequently in consumption, of food. In the reﬁning of sugar and vegetable
oil, modern production paradigms were adopted simultaneously by a number of
small ﬁrms. Pioneers in the new high volume packaged technologies, such as
Borden in canned milk, Heinz in canned vegetables, Campbell soup in canned
soups, Libby, McNeill in canned meat, and later California Packing, aliter del
Monte, in canned fruit, made occasional acquisitions. Moreover, because the
foods they processed were perishable, they also invested in in extensive purchas-
ing and storage organizations that assured a ﬂow of seasonally grown products
through their processing plants.
In chemicals, the ﬁrst enterprises to exploit fully the new high volume pro-
duction and packaging technologies in soap - Procter and Gamble, paints -
Sherwin-WIlliams -, and pharmaceuticals - Parke, Davis -, consolidated their
dominant position in their industries throughout an entire century. Their chal-
lengers, such as Colgate in soap and Glidden in paints, followed much the same
pattern of growth.
Only three mergers of a certain signiﬁcance interested industrial chemicals,
arousing in the E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company, formed between
1902 and 1904, in General Chemicals, an 1899 merger of eleven producers of
sulphuric and chemically related acid, and ﬁnally in the Barrett Company, an
1896 combination of several ﬁrms producing coal-tar products. The managers
63See Chandler (1990), pp.127-140.
30of the resulting companies accompanied followed legal consolidation with ad-
ministrative centralization, thus reshaping many of the industry’s facilities and
the activities of its personnel. In electrochemicals, Union Carbide’s investments
opened the way to a series of new plants. Interestingly, a scanty evidence of
growth by merger is available for the industry; the only relevant illustrative
examples have Allied Chemical & Dye and Union Carbide & Carbon as protag-
onists.
In the nonelectrical machinery, the focal sectors were sewing, led by Singer
Sewing Machine, oﬃce, initiaited in 1875 by Remington Typewriter Company,
quickly followed by others, such as Underwood, Densmore, Smith Premier and
Yostand, and ﬁnally agricultural machinery, McCormick and Deering, which
combined, together with three smaller ﬁrms, in 1892, to originate the Inter-
national Harvester Company, in order to face the increasing intensiﬁcation of
competition. In 1935, the eight largest ﬁrms in the sewing machines industry
accounted for 90% of the American output, and the eight largest in typewriters
for 99%.
The automobile industry marked one of the most impressive and rapid pro-
gesses on the American industrial scenario. The assets of entrepreneurs in au-
tomobiles and allied products quickly boosted, while those of producers of older
transportation equipment grew at a much slower rate. By 1925, the automobile
industry ranked ﬁrst in wage paid, in cost of materials, in value added by man-
ufacturing, and in the value of product. A detailed history of the automobile
industry is very well known, yet very peculiar, and therefore it is omitted in the
present discussion.
The American electric sector assumed at the end of the nineteenth century
the leading role in the world; its supremacy was established by the opening
at Pearl Street in New York City in 1882 of the world’s ﬁrst central power
station. Dominated by Westinghouse and General Eletrics, itself resulting from
the merger of two giants, Thomson Houston and Edison General Electric, the
sector prospered in spite of the absence of governmental concessions, and of the
deriving legally enforced regional monopolies, which instead characterized the
Italian plight. Agreements within the major manufacturers thus consolidated
the industry oligopoly.
After the qualitative analysis of the condition of the American industrial
sector in the relevant period, a quantitative exam on the concentration indexes
follows. The most meaningful computations have been performed by Chandler
and by Nutter and Einhorn. In their work, Nutter and Einhorn present an
accurate summary of the level of concentration of the American industry at the
end of the nineteenth century, reporting bounds obtained by the comparison
of previous and contemporary studies on the subject. The following tables,
grouped according to the products, synthetize their results:
31Mining Output controlled by largest ﬁrms
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Metal mining Copper 33-60 1
64 4
Iron Ore 60-85 1
Anthracite mines 90 6
84 4
Non metal mining Asphalt 35-95 1
Food, beverages and tobacco Output controlled by largest ﬁrms
Industry Product Per cent Number of ﬁrms
Food Meat packing 50-"bulk" 4
Biscuits & crackers 70 1
Canned fruits 40 1
Canned milk "large" 1
Sugar reﬁning 57-90 1
Beverages Liquors 100 1
Tobacco Cigarettes 75-90 1
Textile Output controlled by largest ﬁrms
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Cotton goods Duck 45-90 1
Thread 50-67 1
Yarn 20-40 1
Cordage and twine 48-58 3
Wool Woolen and worsted 60 1
Oilcloth 50 1
Leather Sole leather 50 1
Upper leather 75 1
Rubber and paper Output controlled by largest ﬁrms
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Rubber Shoes 50-70 1
Other rubber 40-100 1
Paper Pulp 70-80 1
Newsprint 60-80 1
Writing paper 55 1
Envelopes 50-60 1
Wallpaper 60 1
Printing Material Publishing 77 1
32Chemicals Output controlled by largest ﬁrm
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Cons. chemicals Heavy chemicals 70 1




Glue and Gelatin 55 1
Paints and varnishes 85-95 1
Salt 30-90 1
Ind. chemicals Explosives ”Substantial” 1
Fertilizers Phosphates 60 1
Oil, clay, glass Output controlled by largest ﬁrm
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Oil Petroleum Reﬁning 80-86 1
Clay Pottery 65 1
Glass Table glassware 50-70 1
Plate glass 72-80 1
100 4
Window glass 73 1
Iron and steel Output controlled by the largest ﬁrms
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Blast furnace Pig iron 43 1
Steel-mill Overall 61-75 1
Ingots and castings 66 1
Rails 60 1
Plates and sheets 65 1
Nails and spikes Overall 65-90 1
Steel springs Railway cars 95 1
Wire Smooth wire 75-80 1
Cast iron Soil pipe 80-95 1
Nonferrous metals Output controlled by the largest ﬁrms
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Smelting and reﬁning Copper 30 1
64 4
Lead 85-95 1
Secondary metals 100 2
Gold and silver 85-100 1
Silverware Overall 10-40 1
Plated ware 55-60 1
33Machinery Output controlled by the largest ﬁrm
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Foundry and machine shop Pneumatic 87 1
Air compressors 80 1
Car wheels 20 1
Brake shoes 90 1
Elevators 65-85 1
Boobins and shuttles 85-90 1
Shoe machinery 50 1
Heavy steam power 80 1
Agricultural implements Overall 70-85 1
Seeding 90 1
Hand 80 1





Transportation Output controlled by the largest ﬁrms
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Equipment Bicycles 65-70 1
Railroad Cars 65 1
Locomotives 70 1
100 2
Ship and boats 35-60 1
Transportation Steam railroads 100 4
Pipelines, oil 84-96
Water transport. 40 1
Trade, communication, energy Output controlled by the largest ﬁrms
Industry Product Per Cent Number of Firms
Trade Illuminating oil 89 1
Communication Telephone "very high" 1
Telegraph "very high" 1
Electric Light Power systems 90 2
Source: Nutter-Einhorn (1969), pp. 132-136.64
The tables by Nutter and Einhorn indicate that the American industrial con-
centration outweighted, in most of the sectors, the Italian one. However, since
the United States could exploit the ﬁrst movers advantage, their heavy industry
64For a precise statement of the sources and a discussion of the methods, the reader is
referred to Nutter-Einhorn (1969), ch.1, pp.1-13, and Appendix B, pp. 122-150.
34sector did not have any problems in getting ﬁnanced. Therefore, subtracting
the rent to the ﬁrms in favor of the consumers would not have damaged the
American industrial sector. On the other hand, it might well be possible that it
was not optimal. The analysis would require an higher degree of specialization.
One view about that has been expressed by Chandler65, who, referring to the
Sherman Antitrust Act, claimed that ”The legislation was more an expression
of fundamental American values than the results of pressure groups at work.
Unlike the Interstate Commerce Act, passed three years earlier, its enactment
had not been demanded by a powerful group of shippers and wholesalers. In-
deed, it was passed with relatively little debate and even less opposition. The
vote in the Senate was 52-1, and the vote in the House was 242-0, with 85
members not voting. Not surprisingly, the terms of the statute were imprecise
and therefore ambiguous, but it made clear the strong antimonopoly bias of
the American public. This legislation, ampliﬁed by the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions in the 1890s, and enforced by the executive branch in the early year
of the next century, remained uniquely American; no other nation adopted a
comparable law before World War II. That legislation and the values it reﬂected
pobably marked the most important non-economic cultural diﬀerence between
the United States and Germany, Britain, and indeed the rest of the world, inso-
far as it aﬀected the long term evolution of the modern industrial enterprise”.
Chandler interprets the Antitrust as a noneconomic factor. Within a compar-
ison with the Italian situation, it can be said that, while for the Italian case
the Antitrust legislation would have produced a negative impact on the country
economy, hampering the development of a vital portion of the Italian industries,
the American antitrust revealed itself neutral with respect to the American in-
dustrial development. However, Chandler’s assessment is not universally agreed
upon. Therefore, an evaluation of the economic impact is required.
6C o m p a r a t i v e a n a l y s i s
The previous analysis has shown that the drawbacks of the application of an
Antitrust policy in the Italian experience for the time period 1890-1920 would
have unambigously oﬀset its potential advantages. Indeed, an Antitrust law
would have been neutral with respect to the already fragmented light industry
labor-intensive sector, meanwhile being detrimental vis à vis the capital inten-
sive industry. The argument for the negative impact of Antitrust on the heavy
industry has been articulated in the following way. In order for a capitalist or
for a ﬁnancial institution to endorse a project, proﬁtability in a reasonably short
period is required. However, ﬁxed costs, added to the initial high operational
costs stemming from lack of productive and organizational know-how, imply
that short-run proﬁtability has necessarily to be coupled with a suﬃciently high
level of prices. Competition from mature foreign industries triggers unsustain-
ability of high national prices; furthermore, the negative correlation between
65See Chandler (1990), p. 72.
35prices and demand is suitable to constrain the rise of a capital intensive indus-
try in a young, thus limited-sized, market, in ultimis determining a null optimal
number of ﬁrms. In such a scenario, an institutional push, in the speciﬁc instance
provided by the public sector, appears to stand as a condicio sine qua non for
creating a virtuous circle leading to the development of the heavy industry. An
Antitrust law would have gone in the opposite direction, divesting industries of
a share of their proﬁts, and consequently interposing a farther stumbling-block
for the ﬁnancers, and thus for the creation of the industry. An evaluation of the
eﬀects - both direct and external - of the heavy industry on the overall Italian
economic performances allowed to conclude that beneﬁts brought by the heavy
industry have largely outweighted the costs, and, as a consequence, that the
Italian choice not to adopt an Antitrust can reasonably be deemed eﬃcient.
The American capital intensive industry diﬀered from the Italian one in two
main respects. At ﬁrst, it enjoyed in most circumstances the position of ﬁrst
mover, from which derives the feasibility of a pattern of gradual expansion in
the absence of foreign competitive pressure, and secondly, its output was di-
rected to a much larger market, naturally protected by the foreign competitors.
These two peculiarities gave ﬁnancers of new industrial projects, usually ex-
ploiting signiﬁcant inventions or innovations, a solid expectation of a short run
positive proﬁt, since the initial high prices for the output could in this case still
be conjugated with a strong demand for the product, given the large market
and, alternatively, either the absence of foreign competitors or the geographical
shelter. The sustained demand in turn determines a positive optimal number of
ﬁrms, even in the presence of a high optimal ﬁrm size, due to economies of scale
resulting from capital intensity. From this reasoning, it may be deduced that
the American capital intensive industries, also said second industrial revolution
industries, boomed independently of the State, and rapidly managed to reduce
their total costs, and to expand the market. In this environment, the Sher-
man Act was approved, with a series of repercussions that clearly looked very
far from those which would have occurred in Italy had an analogous provision
been passed. For the United States, the issue of survival of the industries in
the aftermath of the law is not susceptible of being raised. The ditto reported
data reveal the elevated remuneration of capital at that time; the substraction
of a portion of it, through the Antitrust provision, could not reverse the ﬁrm’s
proﬁtability, and as a consequence could not indeed ultimately undermine the
existence of the industry.
[First: prevent the emergence of cartels. From the economic viewpoint, the
eﬀect of cartels can be classiﬁed into a direct and an indirect eﬀect. Direct eﬀect:
oligopolistic production and pricing policies, the eﬀect of which is the reduction
of total surplus. Circumstances under which this is negative can be classiﬁed
according to the “outside option” total surplus: the capital intensive industries
at their early stages of development, and, more generally, all the industries that
would not exist weren’t the market conditions oligopolistic. For the rest, it is fair
to claim that ﬁghting cartel was positive. Indirect eﬀect: innovation. Chandler’s
point: innovation is enhanced by competition vs. Schumpeter’s point: to inno-
vate, need rents, which may easily be oligopolistic rents. Historical evidence is
36provided by Chandler, and obviously supports his view. So, for indirect eﬀects,
oligopoly should never be deemed positive, thus Antitrust should be deemed
positive.
Second eﬀect of the Antitrust policy: preventing the emergence of market
power, which can give rise to situations of excessive political power in a hand-
ful of areas. Translated into policy: prohibition of attempting to monopolize
the market, so: Prohibition of mergers; dissolution of ﬁrms in monopolistic sit-
uation. Circumstances under which such policy can be negative: in case of
capital-intensive industries, in which production at the minimum eﬃcient scale
entails a monopolistic situation, the losses from cost increase can oﬀset the gains
from a competitive pricing and production policy in the new competitive situa-
tion. There is scanty evidence of this trade-oﬀ. Also, again innovation issue as
an indirect eﬀect (see supra).
Third eﬀect: let small business operate, freedom of existing for small busi-
ness. Translated into policy: preventing cost cutting so that small business
could stay alive regardless of their economic eﬃciency. Economic impact of this
is negative in the short run: you impose an oligopolistic production and pricing
policy, getting far from economic eﬃciency in terms of both total surplus and
productive eﬃciency. In the long run, despite the apparent contrasts, it can
be assimilated to the policy of preventing the emergence of market power by
private actors. Thus, on the long run, the economic impact of this policy is
unclear.
In conclusion, it is not clear whether the adoption of the antitrust law in
the United States has really been optimal from an economic standpoint. More
precise measurements and considerations would be required in order to evaluate
the impacts of the various previously mentioned economic consequences of the
Antitrust policy, and to assess whether the advantages of an antirust policy
have really oﬀset its costs (in this case, we would obviously have eﬃciency), or,
on the other hand, if the contrary happened (and in the latter case, this would
certainly be ineﬃcient)].
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In the conclusive paragraph, I present an overview of the most salient points
raised during the paper, and, from the speciﬁc issue that has been considered, I
attempt to induce some implications with a general validity, capable of leading
to valuable rules of optimal policies.
Italy and the United States proceeded along two diverting path of industrial
expansions in the analyzed spell. The comparison provides some useful insights
on the role of institutional factors, speciﬁcally the State, in the rise and in the
control of heavy, capital-intensive industries. The diﬀerent modus operandi of
the public institutions in the industrial growth of the two countires is reckoned
to respond to diﬀerent exigencies of the underlying economy. The general lesson
that can be inferred concerns the optimal role of the State during the string of
the evolution stages of each capital intensive industry within an economy. As
37a tendency, the availability of a source of ﬁnancing represents a precondition
for the growth of a capital intensive heavy industry; in circumstances of small
markets or of exposure to foreign products manufactured by more advanced
competitors, short or medium run proﬁtability is not warranted, and therefore
the private sector cannot alone create the industry. Under these conditions, the
intervention of public institutions, in the above listed conﬁgurations, ﬁnalized
at increasing the industry’s proﬁts in the short and medium term, appears to
be an indispensable push for the industry. Evidently, a relatively backward
country satisifes these conditions, and a fortiori does a country in which a
certain industry, already established in other nations, does not exist, or adopts
ancients technologies uncapable of competing with the most advanced ones.
This was the case of a signiﬁcant portion of the Italian heavy industry sector at
the end of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, in the absence of exposure to
most eﬃciently produced foreign products, and in the presence of a suﬃciently
large market, a capital intensive industry can combine high prices and sustained
demand for its output, thus private capitalists can coordinate to ﬁnance its
birth and its consolidation. In both instances, an Antitrust law could not be
deemed as a wise policy: when the State should optimally intervene to yield
industry proﬁtability, Antitrust, which shrinks capital remuneration, would be
detrimental; when an industry can be created by private capitalists, it still needs,
at its outset, high level of proﬁts to compensate for the amortization of ﬁxed
costs and other start-up costs, and an Antitrust law could in principle undermine
the incentives for the creation of the industry. Summarizing, in the initial phase
of the development of a capital intensive industry, the attitude of the public
institutions towards the industry proﬁts should be positive or neutral, in the
sense that a State’s most eﬃcient policy should either support the industry or
be permeated by the laissez faire, according to the circumstances.
In a successive stage, which could be referred to as the maturity stage, when
the dimension of the market and the costs are set to a steadier level, each
public institution should gauge the trade-oﬀ emerging from the application of
Antitrust, along the lines exposed in the previous paragraphs, and act accord-
ingly.
To generalize the results, and provide a ﬂavor of an analysis of external va-
lidity and of policy implications, the identiﬁcation of the main ingredients of the
argument is an important step. They can be systematized in the capital inten-
sive industry, the level of backwardness, or the absence at all, of the industry in
the country, and the dimensions of the market. It is reasonable to assess that the
ﬁndings do not apply ipso facto t ol a b o ri n t e n s i v e ,o rh u m a nc a p i t a li n t e n s i v e ,
industries, for which the investing issue does not arise, and for which advan-
tages from economies of scale are arguable. It is now important to brieﬂyr e ﬂect
upon the implications of backwardness. A backward industry, or an industry
on the verge of being created with a lag with respect to foreign countries, faces
diﬃculties in being ﬁnanced if the demand at the prices required to guarantee
short run proﬁtability is insuﬃcient. This implies that explanations for short
run non proﬁtability, besides the expenses for ﬁxed capital, can be cathegorized
in the excessively limited size of initial market, and in the non-transmissibility
38of technological or organizational skills from other advanced industries in the
country. These conditions are usually veriﬁed after a process of an industrial
revolution, of which the second industrial revolution has been one of the most
dramatic examples, or after similar processes of drastic modiﬁcations in the in-
dustrial output, organization, or technology, whose eﬀect include a growth of
the size of the market on one side, and the non transmissibility of productive or
organizational skills from pre-shock industries. Therefore, the necessity of pub-
lic subsidization for a young industry ceteris paribus, is positively correlated
with the degree of discontinuity with respect to the previous industrial experi-
ences, while, by the same token, the lenght of the stabilization process for a new
born industry - during which an Antitrust law would undermine the existence
of the industry - is positively correlated to such discontinuity. Capital intensive
industries in the considered time period were aﬀected by the second industrial
revolution, thus satisﬁed the previously listed assumptions.
In conclusion, the ﬁndings obviously conﬁrm the general theory of regulation,
according to which the standard criterion for the evaluation of monopoly versus
perfect competition, and all the intermediaries combinations in-between, is the
maximization of social surplus. The paper sets the general theory into speciﬁc
cases, historically explores the optimaliy of Antitrust policies, and, through an
inductive process, identiﬁes a set of public policies, for the relevant case, that
allow to achieve the optimal result.
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